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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: 'l'HE PRCiBLEM AND I'l!-:~THOD
01', THE THESIS

When one approaches the concept of humanism with the
intention of subduing it and caging it within the bars of
philosophic definition, he finds that he is battling a formidable adversary.

The concept of humanism is an elusive one;

one that .almost defies definition.

All persons of liberal edu-

cation have some general idea of what humanism means.

But the

concept itself is necessarily vague, with the result that no
two thinkers, apparently, have ever explained it in exactly
the same way.

All agree as to its semplest, most generic notes.

But beyond that they reach such extremes of difference as that
of T. S. Eliot, who maintains that it is the non-dogmatic handmaid of dogmatic religion, and Irving Babbitt, wb.o claims it
as the modern alternative to the dogmatic religion which he
considers obsolete.
The problem of worki.ng out a satisfactory definition
of humanism is further complicated by the fact thut it is surrounded by a whole relationship of other concepts equally vague.
Such concepts, for instance, are t fJose of culture, ui vi.liza tion,
literature, and liberal education; all of which are understood

2

easily enough in a general and therefore vague manner, but
which are also incapable of universally satisfactory.definit ion.
In the present thesis it is proposed to discover what
Thomas Stearns Eliot means by the term "humanism."

Thus limited

in its meaning, humanism is both more easy and more difficult
to analyze and define than is humanism more generally understood.
It is easier to define because the definition need not
versally satisfactory.
as T.

s.

b~

uni-

It is to be the definition of humanism

Eliot gives it piecemeal throughout his prose writings,

whatever other critics may happen to thihk of that definition.
It should be noted, however, that even here lfe cannot expect too
much, for Eliot himself says in ao many words that the concept
of true humanism in necessarily vague.l

One suspects that he

would be rather impatient with any attempt to reduce humanism
to philosophic definition.
Humanism as understood by Eliot is more difficult of

.

analysis than humanism in general, first because of Eliot's mental attitude, and secondly because of his approach to humanism
in his prose writing.
Of Eliot's mental attitude it may be said that char-

1

T. S. Eliot, Selected Essays, Harcourt, Brace and Company,
New York, 1932, 401.

3

acteristically it is excessively cautious.
Mr. Eliot feels answerable to tradition
for every judgment he makes: but this accepted responsibility, while it gives his criticism weight, sometimes makes it curiously
timid. Thus if his enthusiasms are never
wild, his understatements sometimes are ••••
In these instances Mr. Eliot's caution becomes mechanical, and functions where it is
not needed and has no meaning.2
Again:
Eliot's mind still shows signs of
old habits of scepticism. Sophisticated,
disillusioned, enlightened, and converted
in turn, he has come through his mental
trials with a bit of the scepticism peculiar to each of these stages of development.
He is too smart to commit himself, or too
wary of disappointment ••• , or too religious
to run the risk of hasty and dangerous conclusions; so that he is evasive of definitinn,
prefers several negative circumlocutions to
one clear affirmation of hia mind, clings to
understatement, suspects enthusiasm, and •••
too often takes refuge in the phrases and
attitudes of the sceptic •••• 3
The res1ut of all this "introspective indecision of •••
T.

s.

Eliot," as Allen Tate calls it,4 is of course that it is

difficult to pin Eliot down to a definite statement.

Too fre-

quently he makes a statement only to emasculate it later, as

2· Edwin Muir, Transition, The Viking Press, New York, 1926,
3

4

131 ff.
I. M. Burrill, S.J., The Poetical Theo~ ofT. s. Eliot,
University of Detroit;-netroit, l9~~f7; \Unpublished thesis).
Allen Tate, Reactionary Essays, Scribners', New York,l936,205.

4

if by way of afterthought, by qualifying it so strictly O!i' inserting so much of doubt into it as to render it almost no
statement at all.
Of Eliot's approach to humanism in h:ts prose writings
it is to be said that it is negative, or at best oblique.

The

reason for this is in part the caution and scepticism spoken
of above.

It, or

the rest the reason is the manner in which hu-

manism enters the writings of Eliot.

Most of what he says about

humanism Eliot says in criticism of the so-called "New Humanists" of America, notably Irving Babbitt and Norman Foerster.
The only extended treatment of humanism which he gives in his
writings occurs in three essays: "The Humanism of Irving Babbitt,"5 "Second Thoughts about Humanism,"6 and "Rpligion without Humanism,"7 each of which is written in criticism of the
"New Humanism."

Isolated observations on humanism, and extended

treatments of allied topics are scattered throughout his writings, but never does Eliot give more than a sentence or two to
humanism except in criticism of Babbitt and his fellows.
Despite these difficulties, however, it is possible to

5

Selected Essays, 383 ff.

rr.

6

rbia., 393

7

Humanism and America, edited by Norman Foerster, Farrar and
Rinehart Incorporated, New York, 1930, 105 ff.
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reduce Eliot's ideas on humanism to a positive definition.

In

reading the prose works one can see, if he looks for it, Eliot's
notion of humanism in the large looming in the background of
his critical pronouncements. By attending carefully to his
statements on humanism and allied subjects, one can bring that
looming idea into sharper focus.

An attempt to do this will

be made in the rEmainder of the thesis.
Briefly, the method that will be followed in finding
the answer to the question: "What does T.
manism?" is this.

s.

Eliot mean by hu-

All of Eliot's prose works will be examined

and all the atatements that have a bearing on his theory of
humanism will be noted.

These statements will be analyzed in

the light of their contexts, in the light of each other, and in
the light of the whole of Eliot's thought.

The main work of the

thesis shall have been finished when, out of all that Eliot says
on the subject, a definition of humanism can be synthesized.
After that work has been done it will remain to see what he
thinks with regard to several ideas closely related to humanism
but not entering directly into its definition.

Throughout the

thesis Eliot will do the talking as much a:-:0 possible, and commentators will be called on only when what they have to say
sheds new light on what Eliot says himself.

It should be borne

constantly in mind that it is Elio~-~~ idea of humanism that is
being sought. If Eliot cannot give it to us, no one can.
For a more complete understanding of humanism in this

6

limited sense, however, it will be of great help to consider the
topic in its more general aspects.

'l'his will be done in a brief

survey of the vagaries of humanistic thought from ancient times
to the present.

This historical survey will be made in the

chapter immediately following this.

In subsequent chapters

Eliot's definition of humanism will be extracted and explained,
and the important matter of the relation between humanism and
religion will be dealt with.

CHAPTER II
A BRIEF HISTORICAL SURVEY OF HUMANISTIC THOUGHT
FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE PRESENT

Humanism may be defined in broad terms as a philosophy
of life which envisions as its goal the perfection of human
life achieved through the harmonious development and exercise
of all of man's faculties.

Depending upon the view taken of the

perfection of human life, differing forms of humanism may strive
for a life that disregards anything supernatural and is thought
to be completed on this earth; or it may strive for the fullest
cooperation with supernatural forces.

In the latter humanism,

life on earth wo:;,ld be considered a preparation and a proving
ground for the life to come.

It is not the purpose of the pres-

ent chapter to say which humanism is correct.

But it is well to

realize from the outset that, becau::'e of the extreme breadth
of its comprehension, the concept of humanism is a difficult one
to lay hold of, and one therefore whose history it is not easy
to trace.
• •• The word humanism is ambiguous.
It is clear that whoever uses the word brings
into play at once an entire metaphysic, ;3nd
that the idea we form of humanism will have
wholly aifferen~ implications according to
whether we hold or do not hold that there is
in the nature of man'~~omet':ing which breathes
an air outside of time and a personality
whose profoundest needs surpass the order of

8

the universe.l
The history of humanism as we know it in our western
civilization begins in ancient Greece.

Although there were

other civilizations which antedated the Greek by thousands of
ye:c,rs, it is only with the Greek and its descendants that our
culture has anything like complete continuity.

Our own attain-

ments in art, our philosophic tr1ought, our political theory and
practice, our very language, are heavily indebted to ancient
Greece.

The history of the western nations, the group to whtch,

"physically and intellectually, we belong ••• begins with the
Greeks •..•

By begins I mean not only the temporal commencement,

but also the &pX~· the spiritual source" from which our culture
still draws its vital strength.2
It cannot be denied that our culture is indebted to
other nations yet more ancient than the Greek.

Nor can it be

denied that the culture of ancient Greece was very different
from our own in many respects.

These differences are as nothing,

however, when compared with the vast differences between our culture and the cultures of those other ancient peoples.

Each of

the modern western nations feels that even Greece and Rome are

l

2

Jacques Maritain, True Humanism, Charles Scribner's Sons,
New York, 1938, xir:-Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, Oxford
University Press, New YorK, I9!39, r;-·xv.

~--------------------------------------~
9

in some respects fundamentally alien to her-self: the feeling is based partly on blood
and sentiment, partly on organization and
intellectual outlook, partly on historical
distirictions. But ther;e is a gigantic difference between that feeling and the sense
of complete· estrangement which we have when
we confront the oriental nations, who are
both racially and intellectually different
from us; and it is undoubtedly a serious mistake in historical perspective to separate,
as some modern writers do, the western nations from the Greeks and Romans by a barrier comparable to that which divides us
from China, India, and Egypt.3
There is no Greek word from which our word "humanism"
is directly descended.

The same is true of the Latin tongue,

although it is true that the word huW.anitas took on something
of the meaning of our word "humanism" in Cicero's later writings.

As a matter of fact, it was not unt1.1 1832 that this pre-

cise word was used in English, and there was a lapse of almost
fifty years before it appeHred a second time in English literature.
But while there was no word in ancient Greece from
which our own "humanism" is directly derived, the concept certainly was there.
From our first glimpse of them the qreeks ,
we find that man is the center of their

~

Loc. cit.

~ ~Oi10rd English Dictionary, Oxford, at the Clarendon Press,
T9'33'

v'

444.
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thought. Their anthromorphic gods; their
concentration on the problem of depicting
the human form in sculPture and even in
painting; the logical sequence by wh:i.ch
their philosophy moved from the problem of
the cosmos to the problem of man •.• ; their
poetry, whose inexhaustible theme from Homer throughout all the succeeding centuries
is man, r.d s de~:;t iny, and his gods; and finally their state, which cannot be understood
unless viewed as the force which shaped man
and man's life--all these are separate rays
from one great light. They are the expressions of an anthropocentric attitude to
life, which cannot be explained by or derived from anything else, and which pervades
everything felt, made, or thought by the
Greeks ••••
The Greeks ••• realized the universal
laws of human nature. The intellectual principle of the Greeks in not. individualism but
humanism ••.• 5
The humanistic culture of the Greeks evolved slowly,
its development stretching over the five-hundred-year period
that separates Homer from Plato.

During the fifth century

before Christ the Greek civilization was thoroughly permeated
with a h1unanistic coloring, and it was in the closing days of
this golden age that the humanistic theory reached its sublimest
height in the Platonic writings.
We find a strong interest in man and in his development as man even in the Iliad, for centuries the chief educa-

5

Jaeger, I, xxij_i.

~----------------------:-------------,
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tional instrument of the Greek world.

Each of the heroes in the

tale of the Trojan war is a hero only insofar as he achieves the
ideal set before him as the proper goal of his endeavor.

The

ideal proposed is on a much lower plane than that proposed by
the more fully developed Greek humanism.
ly confined to the physical level.
and above all ••• heroic valour."6

It is an ideal large-

It is "strength and skill •••
It is true that this connotes

much that is above the mere physical, for such an ideal would
appeal only to a mind characterized by a certain nobility; but
the emphasis upon the physical is undoubted.

Indeed the crown-

ing glory of the Iliadic hero was victory in battle? and the
glory and fame that were the expected result of such a victory.B
We of the Christian era may find it rather difficult
to understand how fame could stand so high in the Greek's scale
of values.

Yet stand high it did •
• • • The liomeric man estimated his own worth
exclusively by the standards of the society
to which he belonged. He was a cneature of
his class: he mea.sured his own arete by the
opinion which others held of him ••••
Homer and the aristocracy of hjs time
believed that the denial of honor due was
the greatest of human tragedies.9

The reason for this love of honor reveals another

~
7

~
I"

Ibid., 4.

!DI'a"., 5.

rna.,

7.

-r;oc: cit.

~·~-------------------------------------------1
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racet of the early Greek character and shows a further goal
towards which he struggled.

The Homeric Greek believed that

in attaining fame he ach:teved a sort of "supra-personal"l0 existence which survived his mortal life and gave rich meaning
and purpose to that ll.fe.

Hence the tragedy of a denial of

justly won fame.
'I'his desire for fame is a result of the ennobled selflove w}··ich was another virtue for which the early Greek strove.
Indeed, all of his striving was regulated by this noble selflove, which urged him to make the most of himself and to achieve the brightest possible fame.

The self-love made him

"Reach out towards the h:ighest ••• no-uility," and caused him to
perform acts of moral heroism.

It made him "ready to sacrifice

himself for his friends .or his country, to abandon possessions
and honors"ll in order to achieve nobility, fame, and the sort
of life after death that fame ensures.
The Odyssey was written some time later than the Iliad.
In this work we find an addition to the ideal proposed to the
Greek hero.

In the Odyssey there is still much ma.de of courage

and phJsical prowess with its attendant honor and glory, but
over them is placed cleverness and intellectual skill.

10
11

Ibid., 8.

m.,

11.

"The

13
Qdyssez constantly exalts intellectual ability--especially in its
heDD, whose courage is usually ranked lower than r. . is cleverness
and cunning."l2
The.more fully develpped humanism of the Greeks, that
which the humanists of the Renaissance tried to recreate, began
to appear in the works of the Sophists.

In the teachings of

these variously estimated men, there burst into full flower the
humanism that had so long been swell:J.ng in the bud.

:B1 or they

were the first to make "comrrehensive culture"l3 the conscious
goal and ideal of' their teachings.

Protagoras, the greatest

representatlve of the Sophistic school, clearly had a humanistic
goal in mind for his educational system.
Protagoras' claim that cultural education
is the centre of all human life indicates
that his education was frankly aimed at
humanism. He implies that by subordinating
what we how call civilization--namely technical efficiency--to culture: the clear and
fundamentHl distinction between technical
knowledge and power on one hand, and true
culture on the other, is the very basis of
humanism.l4
The Sophists wished to shape and mould man's soul in
accordance with the form of his true nature.

They believed that

nen were usually capable of being shaped and moulded, and that

12
13
14

Ibid., 4.
Jaeger, II, 300.
Ibid., 297.
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the evil man was out of the ordinary.

They

started with an optimistic belief that
man's nature is usually educable, and is
capable of good; men with unfortunate or
evil dispositions were, they believed,
the exception.l5
The effect which the Sophists had upon the Greece of
their day was a brilliant one, although they themselves were
not always entirely admirable men.

Their resemblance to the

humanists of the Renaissance is striking •
••• They created an atmosphere of comprehensive culture far more alive and stimulating and purposeful than even that of
the Pisistratean age •••• ~hey strongly
resembled the literati of the Renaissance
both in their intellectual arrogance and
in their independence •••• Hippias of
Elis ••• was a perfect~ un1versale.l6
The contribution of the Sophists to the progress of
humanism was this, that through them the theory and the ideal
of culture, oonsciously formed and sought for, came into existence and was established upon a rational fotllldation.

However,

thejr work lacked thorough-going completeness, and it remained
for Plato to work out the highest and truest form of Greek human ism.
The ideal that Plato had in mind for man is explained

15. Ibid., 304.
16 !E.!3!•, 294.

~·----------------------------------------~
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by a figure that he uses in his Republic, proposing the allegory

to illustrate the complicated inner structure of human nature.
He pictures man, or more precisely man 1 s soul, as being composed
of three things: a many-headed monster, a lion, and a man.
What we usually think of as man is only an outward covering
which encloses those three dissimilar and independent things,
;

and makes the three of them seem a unity with no conflicts invalved.

The monster with his many heads, wild and tame, is man

as a creature of desire.

The lion is

m~n

feeling courage, anger, excitement, shame.

as an emotional being,
The true man, the

"man in man," is the intellectual part of the soul.

It is th1.s

"man in man" that Plato's humanism wishes especially to develop,
so that it may keep the other two (which are one in their opposition to it) under proper control.

Thus harmony will reign

in the soul, the harmony which Plato identifies with the allembracing virtue of justice.l7
"
This is Plato's contribution to humanism: the express
concept of the dual nature of man.
Humanism is based on this distinction between man the individual as given by nature and man the higher self. It was
Plato who made it possible for humanism
to have this philosophic distinction.l8

17
18

Republic, 445a.
Jaeger, II, 195.

~------------------------------~
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It is, of course, in this also that Plato's doctrine
differs from that of the Sophists.
direct challenge to the Sophists.l9

Indeed, he offered it as a
For the Sophists took no

cognizance in their essentially optimistic educational theory
of a part of man which is constantly exerting a pressure down
and away from the high, austere ideal which Plato envisioned
for him.

For them there was to be no curbing of the desire for

pleasure except when there appeared the danger of its completely. upsetting the "harmony" of man 1 s life.

For them pleasure

was naturally of greatest impobtance in life, for beyond the
bounds of lite they saw at best uncertainty, and at worst an
eternity of longing for the life that had been lost.
to Protagoras, man was the measure of all things.

According

But man him-

self was measured, as it were, by death, a hard, inevitable,
starkly final fact which even the Sophists could not explain
away.

"Everywhere death is seen closing up the avenues of

$UC-

. cess and prosperity,n20 so every drop of happiness must be wrung
out of success and prosperity while there is time.

This is not

to say that life should be an orgy of unbridled sensual pleasure.

No, important as the senses were in the Sophist scheme of

things, they were not the only things that mattered.

To his

love of bodily excellence the Greek united "a love of, andre-

19
20

Ibid., 277.
Livingstone, The Greek Genius and Its Meanina to Us,
The Clarendon Press;-Qx?ord, 1912, 1~ ---

~.

~~~------------------------------~
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spect for, the things of the mind."21

Man was to live a full

human life, bridling his passions only when they were becoming
so strong as to rule his life completely anc. destroy its harmony.
Plato looked above and beyond this purely human view o1
life to the great vistas of li.fTe lived in purs1rt t of a divine
ideal.

At the highest peak of his humanistic theorizing Plato

says in opposition to Protagoras that God is the measure of all
things,22 and that man should look at Good itself (which he
identifies with God) in order to use it as the pattern after
which he forms his own being.23

Indeed, he is to become even-

tually assimilated to God24 and thus to achieve enduring happiness and the highest destiny which is possible to h:1 m as man.
It would be wrong to suppose that the ordinary Greek
of Plato's day or after followed h:im through all his philosophical reasoning and arrived with him at the contemplation of the
Good.

The average Greek probably reached and remained at the

Sophist level of humanism, not making life a mere animal process,25 although unconscious of the dualism within himself,26

21
22
23
24
25
26

Ibid;., 144.

Lav1s 1 716c.

RePUblic, 540a.
Theaetetus, 176b.
Livingstone~ 116.
!!2.!.£1, 112 r-.

~-~--------------------------------~
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and placing a heavy emphasis upon sense life.27

The humanism

of the ordinary Greek
dispenses with the need for a deity, a
future life, and a purely spiritual world.
It is n~t essentially inconsistent with
these beliefs, and they have often been
found in union with it; but it can do without them. Abolish them for the Greek, and
he would still live the saMe life as if
they were there.28
In general, the "Greek on the street" knew that life might
give a "qualified happiness"29 to anyone.
of

golden~age

The common citizens

Greece

are a homely, genial people ••• too simple
to be intellectualists or hedonists, too
human to be materialists, prizing highly
the common virtues and pieties, but not so
idealistic as to undervalue good looks,
'comfortable means,' public funerals, and
statues at Delphi; inclined to a dark view
of the world, yet able to enjoy it, and
living in kindly simplicity the happy life
of the •natural' man.30
The Roman contribution to humanistic theory was
slight as far as theoretical development is concerned.
things, however, were contributed by the Romans.

Three

First, they

prolonged the life of humanistic thought by taking over to a
greater of lesser extent the humanistic culture of the Greeks.

27 Ibid., 131.
28 Im:-, 123.
29 !Eia., 158.
30 ~·~ 159.

~r----------------------------------------------------------l-9--,
secondly, they caused it to spread somewhat geographically by
carrying it with them in some of their imperial conquests.
Thirdly, in some instances they synthesized the thought that
had crystallized in. the golden age of Greece ano previously.
A good example of such syntheses are Cicero's treatises De

Sen~

ectute and Somnium Scipionis, in which the author summons up
the old bugbears of the Greeks, namely old age and death, and
brings together all that has been written on those subjects in
a vain effort to remove their sting.

In the Somnium Scipionis

followiJg Plato, though freely, he described
a ••• heaven where "all those who have preserved, assisted, or enlarged their fatherland hav~ a special place and enjoy bliss
everlasting." The pathway to this heaven
is by justice and duty (pietas).31
Speak as he will of heaven, Cicero nevertheless keeps
his own desire for glory which is to be won by right performance
of duty.32

Moreover, when plunged into grief by the death of

his beloved Tullia he tried to console himself with the thought
of immortality, but confessed in one of his letters, "omnem consolationem vincit dolor."33
The important point for the present discussion is that
these ideas, with all that they imply with regard to the conduct

31

32

Francis A. Sullivan, "Cicero's Thoughts on Immortality,"
Thought, Fordham University, New York, XVII, 274 (June 1942).
~., 275.

~~------------------------------------------------------------2-0---1
of life, were not original with Cicero.
had worked them over before him. "34

"Plato and other Greeks

The Romans took their hu-

manistic culture from Greece.35
After the complete breakdown of Roman moral life came
inevitably the breakdown of the Roman empire.

When the barbari-

ans from the north went roaring through Italy, the humanism of
the Romans and the Greeks was all but entirely forgotten.

Men

whose ancestors had been brought up in an atmosphere of leisure
and ease found it necessary to work and to sweat and to be constantly vigilant lest their very lives be cut short.

The prime

tenet in the philosophy of life of most Europeans during the
years that lave been

calle~i

the "Dark Ages" was to live--to eat,

to sleep, to beget children, to fight grimly against the constant dange:r·s to llfe.

Only in the monasteries which sprang

from the seed planted by Seint Benedict was the lamp of learning
tended and kept alight.

The monks al·me preserved the memory

of what had been accomplished by the great men of Greek and Roman antiquity.

And when conditions in Europe once again favored

humanistic study it was to the monasteries that the new scholars
had to turn to find the works we now call simply "the classics."
It was the age called the Renaissance, stretching

---------------------------34
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roughly from the fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries, that saw
the first great resurgence of classical human:tsm.

Dante is or-

dinarily cons5.dered the forerunner of Renaissance humanism, for
in his work he evincedtthe new interest in classic literature
that was to sweep Italy and much of Europe.

It is significant

that Dante's guide through hell and purgatory in his Divine
Comedy is the poet Virgil.
To Petrarch, however, is usually assigned the distinction of being the first humanist of the Rena:tssance.

Petrarch,

who lived from 1304 to 1374, was an avid student of the classics
and an ardent admirer of the civilization of ancient Greece
and Rome.

In the company of his dis c:tple and friend Boccacio,

and later of Coluccio Salutato, a c.hancellor of Florence, he
studied such classical writings as were available during his
lifetime and tried "to realize the spirit of the antique world"
which had produced them.36
Many of the classical works we know today, however,
were not at hand for the earliest Renaissance humanists to study.
But as early as 1430 this state of affairs had been completely
changed; for, thanks especially to another Florentine chancellor,
Poggio by name, practically all the Latin works now known were
collected. ·Poggio himself found many Latin manuscripts in the

36 Encyclopedia Brittanica, Fourteenth Edition, XI, 595.
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monasteries to which he had access, bringing to light the works
of

~uintillian

and Lucretius, and the first books of the Annales

of Tacitus.
The first Renaissance teacber of Greek in western Europe was a man named Manuel Chrysolorus, who began his teaching
in 1396.

Great impetus to the study of Greek literature was

given, strangely enough, by the Mohammedan conquest of Constanti
nople in 1453.

For many learned man, flying before tr1e oncom-

ing infidels, settled in Italy, bringing with them in many instances priceless libraries of Greek manuscripts.

Florence,

Rome, and Venice were especially enriched in this way.
The humanistic movement of the Renaissance would hardly have enjoyed the golden era of prosperity that was its lot
if it had not been for the magnificent encouragement that it
received from the ruling families in Italy and from the Popes
of the time.

In Florence, the undisputed capital of Renaissance

humanism, the movement was munif!cently supported by Cosimo de
Medici and later by Lorenze de Medici, called the Magnificent.
The Viscontis and the Sforzas in Milan, the Gonzagas in Mantua,
the Estes in Ferrara all took the .greatest pride in being known
as patrons of the new learning and the new culture.
Nor were the Popes outdone by the purely secular rulers of the day.

Nicholas V founded the Vatican Library and en-

couraged its growth so assiduously that eventually it surpassed

~-------------------------------------.
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all others in the number a nd value of its manuscripts.
couraged classical studies also.

He en-

Among other devices which he

used with this end in view, he offered a prize of ten thousand
gulden for a complete translation of Homer--a prize which,
strangely enough, no one ever won.

He brought to Rome as many

classical scholars as he could, regardless of their attitude
towards religion.

Among them was Lorenzo Valla, remembered

chiefly as the man who declared the Donation

or

Constantine

arable; and an infamous man named Marsuppini who, whatever
his attainments as a scholar, was so extreme an admirer of the
ancient Greeks as to practice their heathen religion.
Other Popes who patronized the new movement were
Pius II (frequently spoken

or

by his personal name, Aeneas

Silvius Piccolomini), who w..__.as a humanist himself as well as a
patron of htooanism; Sixtus IV, who reestablished and enlarged
the Vatican Library; and the Medici Leo X, under whom humanism
had a second Golden Age.
By the time that Leo X died (in 1521), Italian Renaissance had run its course and Italiam humanism was about to
receive ita death blow.
sacked.

The blow fell in 1527 when Rome was

The long years of absorption in gravely important po-

litical and religious problems that followed the gutting of
Rome prevented humanism from comlng back to life in Italy.
Humanism itself, however, was not yet crushed out

24
of l:!."'urope.

In Germany it had taken root 1 though owing to the

"religious and moral earnestness of the Gerrnans 11 37 it never pen&
trated so deeply in that land as it did in Italy 1 nor did it
have the same result.

•rh.e Germans did not go too far in their

love of classic beauty and the joys of sense.

Moreover 1 the

practical Germans gave humanism a practical turn and made it
educational in character to a much greater extent than did the
Italians.

"Sehool and university reform was the chief aim and

the chief service of German humru1ism.n38
German interest in classic literature began in the
fourteenth century under Charles IV 1 but it was not until a hundred years later that humanism really spread in the land.
Aeneas

s.

Piccolomini was the apostle of humanism at the court

of .F'rederick III 1 and later the movement was supported by Emperor Maximiliam I and many influential citizens.

The famous Jo-

hann Reuchlin introduced into Germany the study of Hebrew as a
cvltural and educational medium.
Strasburg was the first real stronghold of humanistic
ideas in Germany.

In that city and elsewhere there sprang up

sonleties devoting themselves to the study or the classics.
the year 1520

37
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all the German Universities had been modernized in the Humanistic sense; attendance
at the lectures on poetry and oratory was
obligatory, Greek chairs were founded,· and
the scholastic commentaries on Aristotle
were replaced by new translations.39
Two of the brightest stars in the firmament of
northern Renaissance humanism were Desiderius
More.

F~asmus

and Thomas

Erasmus, "the most brilliant and the most important lead-

er of German humanism,"40 was born at Rotterdam, probably in
1466.

Part of his early

er~ucation

he received in a humanist

school at Deventer, and part at the monastery in which, under
compulsion, he spent what he later called two lost years.

Thou~

he felt no call to the religious life, he was forced by necessity and the insistence of his guardians to enter a monastery
of the Canons Regular in 1436, where he spent most of his time
studying the ancient classics.

He was ordained a priest in 1492.,

and was sent to Paris to complete his studies.

He found the

scholastic method in vogue there so repugnant that he spent his
time wandering about France, the Netherlands, and later, England.

In England he met Thomas More, Colet., Latimer, and other

famous humanists.

Colet urged him to study the scripture as

a means of reconciling humanism with Catholicism, and he plunged
into the study with vigor.

39
40
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In 1506 Erasmus journeyed to Italy and found himself honored wherever he went by the most distinguished humanists.

-

On his

ret1~n

from Italy he wrote his satire called

The Pralse of Folly in which he mercilessly scourged the abuses

-

in the church.

This work was soon followed by numerous others

of the same general tenor.

Such writings, together with his

rationalistic Paraphrases of the New Testament, and his immoral
Colloquia, prepared the way for the

R~formation.

In~eed,

Eras-

mus was long on cordial terms with Luther, and broke definitely
with him only in 1524 when he feared that he was losing the oonfidence of both the Reformers and t1·:e Catholics.
In his declining years Erasmus held aloof from
religious controversy and -usied himself with editions of
the cla.ssics and of the Fathers of the Church.

He abandoned

the system of purely natural morals he had taken up in imitation of the morality of the classic ages, and died "with all

the signs of a devout trust in God"4l __ though for some unknown
reason without the last sacraments--in 1536.
Opinions of Erasmus differ widely.

He cannot be

defended without reserve, for he had obviously serious defects
of character.
His religious ideal was purely humanistic:

41
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reform of the church on the basis of her
traditional constitution, the introduction
of humanistic 11 enlighten..'11ent" into ecclesiastical doctrine, without, however, breaking with Rome.42
Erasmus was a

p~tent

factor in the educational world

of his day, for he worked unceasingly for the spread of humanistic learning, and by his influence upon scholars and by his work
of editing and translating Greek and Latin authors, he gave powerful impetus to the study of the classics.

Indeed, he exempli-

fies well the good and the bad points in Renaissance hmnanism.
His work upon classic writings, his advocacy of a systematic
study of these writings as instruments of humanistic culture,
are of undoubted value.

But on the other hand his tendency to

accept the purely human--and therefore heathen--morality of the
anciants, his impatience with philosophic reasoning, and his immoderate attacks upon the church to which scholasticism was devoted, have done great harm.
It is unfortunate that Erasmus could not have shared
the piety and devotion to the church which characterized hls
friend, Thomas More.

More

Wf!S

also a man of brilliant intellect,

and one devoted to humanism, a soundly Christian humanism.

Even

while lecturing in law he spent some of his time writing Latin
and English verse, and later collaborated with a friend in pro-

42
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ducing a book of epigrams from the Greek.

Always interested in

classical studies, he wrote much in Latin, his works being for
the most part of a pious nature.

It may be said of him, how-

ever, that he was interested in living in a soundly humanistic
way more than in preaching theoretical humanism to others.

To

his learning he added wisdom, foresight, tact, kindness, friendliness, wit, and in general a

cha~m

that still clings to.his

memory even after the lapse of centuries.
acter were admlrably balanced.

His life and his cha

Compareri with More in this re-

spect, Erasmus looks crabbed and almost petty.

More's admirable

life was crowned with martyrdom in 1535.
Humanism never flourished as luxuriantly in northern
Europe as it did in Italy.

The constant preoccupation with

pressing religious battles which was necessitated in the northern cou11tries precluded such deep interest in general culture.
Moreover, the sharp cleavage with:tn and between nations in matters of religion tended to make any system of thought which
harked back to pagan days a subject to be avoided.

It is not

surprising then that humanism as an explicit philosophy of life
and thought had died by the end of the sixteenth century.

.

The following is a verdict for Italian humanism which
may be applied in greater or lesser extent to the humanism of
other nations of the Renaissance:
The chief merit of Italian Humanism,

r-~----------------------------------2-9,
and indeed of Humanism in ge-neral, was that
it opened up the real resources of ancient
culture and drew from these, as a subject
of study for its own sake, ·the classic literature which until then had been used in
a merely fragmentary way .••• More influential still, but not to good effect, were
the religious and moral views of pagan antiquity. Christianity and its ethical system suffere'l a. serious shook. Moral relations, especially marria.ge, became the subject ·)f ribald jest. In their private lives
meny Humanists were deficient in moral sense,
while the mnrals· of the upper classes degenerated into a pitiable excess of unreatrained
individualism.43
A word should be said here about Rousseau, the Frehch
theorist of the eighteenth century.
perfect state for man "a

primitiv~

Rousseau postulated as the
happy •state of nature,

t

a sort of distorted version of the earthly paradise referred
to in divine revelation.~4

Since man had somehow fallen from

that harpy state and blunderer' more and more in his attempts
to recapture it, Rousseau urged that man cut away entirely from
the mistakes of the past and 11 ve aga:ln the primitive lif'e of'
the "noble savage."

He held out the hope that the whole field

of living could be transformed, and that perfect happiness could
be achieved on earth.
Because of the wide influence that Rousseau has had on
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modern education, and because his vague system of education can
be put under the broad definition of humanism, he should be mentioned here.

But brief mention is enough, because he is apart

from the humanist tradition, especially in his advocBcy of complete separation of the present from the past.
The so-called New Humanists of the twentieth century
next brought humanism into prominence.

Irving Babbitt,·at the

tLne Professor of French at Harvard, introduced the new system
shortly after the first World War.

Before long the New Humanism

attracted a considerable following, and, as was to be expected,
considerable opposit:Ion.

It flourished for a decade or more;

but then, owing to dissension within the ranks of the New Humanists themselves with regard to vitally important philosoPhical
matters, it went into a decline.

After the deaths of some of

its most eminent proponents, notably Babbitt and Paul Elmer More,
the movement ceased to e_ngage the interest of the literary and
philosophic world--as a summary inspection of the annual book
and magazine indexes will show.
The New Humanism has as :t ts goal the old humanist.

~deal of the perfection of human life to be achieved by a pro~rtionate

~ture.

and harmonious development of every part of human

For standards of perfection it looks to the classical

cultures of Greece and Rome and to other civilizations, from

~ich it selects. whatever seems worthy of preservation.

One of
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its tenets is the "nothing too much" of the Greeks, another the
"Golden Rule" of Christ.45

Its basic principle is the rule of

restraint, in which the New Humanism. is profoundly influenced
by the youthful life of its founder, Irving Babbitt.
Born in Dayton, Ohio, in 1865, of rather impractical
parents, Babbitt was unguided and undisciplined during his

yout~

and in later years worked out his oWn code of self-discipline,·
the heart of the New Humanist d@ctrine.

Babbitt saw clearly

the dual nature of man, that the human being is divided within
himself, being drawn towards beauty

~d

goodness on the one hand

and towards evil and its ugliness on the other.
The first article of Babbitt's humanist creed was the dual nature of man. He
saw clearly that all men are born with desire for beauty, truth, and goodness, which
i~ perfectly combined would result in a perfect order; and at the same time with a tendency to evil, wh:tch tendency, if not
grasped by the intellect and opposed by the
will, results in intolerable disorder.46
Thus in its most fundamental principles the New Humanism is opposed to the monist fallacies of naturalism and materialism.
Realizing that the conflict between the two tendencies in man must be won by the more specifically human tendency

45
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if the person is to achieve happiness in a full development
of his total manhood, New Humanism looks about for a means of
keeping the lower tendency in proper control.

It rejects su-

pernatural religion, believing that to be in its own way as
alien and improper to man's nature as the gross sensuality of
ma:t;erialism.

Seeki.ng to have man lead his life and find his

happiness entirely on a purely human plane of existence that
lies midway between the natural (or purely sensual) and the
supernatural planes, the New Humanists say man's own "higher
will" should operate to keep his passions in check.

This is

the famous .. inner check" or "frein vital" of New Humanism.
This primacy of the
great importance.

~

in the New Humanism is of

A man's character depends upon the proper

cultivation of the will, and his dignity is determined by the
constancy with which he exercises his w111 in governing andrestraining his appetites for pleasure and power.

Only thus can

man achieve happiness, according to Babbitt, for "the good life
is not primarily something to be known but something to be
willed."47

It is to be noted, however, that the sense in which

Babbitt speaks of the will is rather limited.
is exclusively a power of control.

47

For him the will

Babbitt "has seized upon a

Irving Babbitt, On Being Creative, Houghton Mifflin, Boston,
1932, xxxvi.
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single manifestation of the voluntary in man--the power of control--and has limited the will to that. "48
The reasons for the New Humanist insistence upon the
exclusion of the supernatural from their system of thought are
interesting to speculate upon.

Hoffman Nickerson says of Bab-

bitt:
It is strange that so powerful an intellec~ deeply concerned with those things
in man which are not animal but specifically human, so insistent ••• th~1t for good or
ill "man is ••• the infinite animal,w should
have so persistently shied away from the
idea of God. Perhaps the crudity and barbarous taboos of the Bible-worshipping
Protestant sects of his Ohio youth were
Pesponsible; perhaps it was the faint
but unmistakable odour of Unitarian skepticism still clinging to Harvand; it may
have been the bitter hatred of all Christian things that fills all the official
:B,rench universities; perhaps the old Jew
Levi under whom Babbitt studied at the
College de France found a way to feed a
racial hatred of the Faith by swerving
young minds towards the bottomless pit
of Buddhism. At all events, there is this
queer gap in Babbitt's thought.49
·
T.

s.

Eliot suggests that Babbitt

knows too many religions and philosophies,
has assimilated their spirit too thoroughly ••• to be abl~ to give himself to any.
The result is humanism.SO
~8
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This point of religion and the supernatural and of
their place in life became a stumbling block to the New Humanism.

On this P'int there grew up dissension within the ranks.

paul Elmer More stated that "the sanction of immortality was a
necessary adjunct to the humanistic program for the restoration
of the moral order,~51 and was bitterly opposed by many of his
fellow humanists.

T.

s.

Eliot and numerous lesser critics have

attacked the New Humanists on this point, and it seems certain
that their criticism has had some effect upon the remaining New
Humanists.

The New Humanism w OLtld se m to have come to the

point at which it must aband:Jn its ideal of a life of perfection
on the mythical middle plane of pure humanism and accept the necessity of religion, or wither. away in sterile theorizing.
New Humanists, including Norman Foerster (their

11

The

fugleman" as

T. S. Eliot calls him)52 seem to have come to this realization.
From the New Humanism the transition to the humanism
of T.

s.

Eliot is easy and natural, for it was this very

~ove

ment which elicited the comments upon humanism in which he reveals his humanistic theory.

The history of humanism, extend-

ing as it does over almost thirty centuries, 1nevitably dwarfs
any modern man who is viewed against it as a background.

51
52
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there are few moderns who are so significant in the development
of this system of thought as Thomas Stearns Eliot.

Eliot is

inportant because he takes culture and humanism very seriously,
and because Lis critical powers are acute.
There can be no doubt that Eliot takes culture {and
humanism, which, as it shall be shown, is in his mand most intimately relatec to culture) very seriously.

Born in Saint

Louis, Missouri, in 1888, and educated in the M:1.ddle West and at
Harvard, Eliot left the United States in 1911.

He studied at

the Sorbonne, Paris, a_nd at Merton College, Oxford, and in 1914
took up :sesidence in L()ndon, his home ever since.

Because he

found the cultural life of England more to his liklilmg than that
of Arner ica, he completely expatriated hi:r;.self.

He entered the

High AngliC:.in Church and, j_n 1927, became a Eritish citizen.
He declares himself a classicist in literature, a Royalist in
politics, and an Anglo-Catholic in religion.
Eliot 1 s

renoV~n

and influence both as critic and as

poet is surprisingly great considering the comparatively meager
output of his pen.

m.s volumes of poems are all slim sheaves,

one of them, Ash-Wednesday, containing only sixteen loosely
printed pages of text.
rather small in size.

His prose works, all critical, ar~ also
Besides having written these books, Eliot

has cont1r.·ibuted numerous articles to such magazines as his own

---....__-

-

Criterion, and to The Hound and the Hsrn, The Spectator, The

-
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Bookman, etc., and has written

prefac~s

to a n-umber of books.

Furthermore, since a man of his stature is in frequent demand
as a speaker and lecturer, he has rather frequent opportunity
to air his views from the platform, and to set down his speeches
in print afterwards.

Topics connected with his adoptive church

also interest him vitally, and he has a number of small pamphlets on ecclesiastical topics.

Most of these articles, pre-

faces, speeches, etc., have been reprinted, however, in his own
collections of his essays.

"The volume of work published by

Mr. Eliot is exceedingly small in comparison with the influence
he has exeryed over the younger writers both in America and
England.tt53
1

'I he brevity of form which Eliot's critic ism takes;:Jis

misleading.

There is a fulness of quality about his work that

more than makes up for the scantiness in quantity.

Moreover,

Eliot is an original thinker.
There is probably no writer of our time
who has said more things about the art
of literature which are at once new and
incontrovertible than Mr. T. s. Eliot ••••
With every subject he has attempted he has
only made a beginning, said a few pregnant
or subversive words, and stopped.... This
impression of incompleteness is lar@ely
misleading. It is only when one tries to

53
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discover what essential aspect ••• has been
left untreated in Mr. Eliot's essay that
one realizes how nearly complete it is ••••
In one way Mr. Eliot is the most complete
critic of our time.54
T.

s.

Eliot is a critic to be reckoned with.

worth while to see what he has to say of humanism.

54

Edwin Muir,

~ ~~

131 ff.

It will

CHAPTER III
THE GENERIC NOTE OF ELIOT'S HUMANISM: CULTURE

In one of his essays written in criticism of the New
Hu~•anism,

Eliot attempts to "distinguish the functions of

true humanism from t'-Lose imposed upon it by zealots. "1
lists these functions under eight numbers.

He

Although he states,

characteristically, after giving it that "the list is not exhaustive or defining, but consists merely of qualifications
which occur immediately to my nind,"2 it will be worth while to
give it here in full, because it contains in germ all that he
has to say about humanism.
I. The .function of humanism is not
to provide dogmas, or philosophical theories. Humanism, because it is general culture, is not concerned with philosophical
foundations; it is concerned less with
"reason" than with common sense. When it
proceeds to exact definitions it be~omes
something' other than itself.
II. Humanism makes for breadth, tolerance, equilibrium and sanity. It operates against fanaticism.
III. The world cannot get on without breadth, tolerance, and sanity; any
more than it can get on withouu narrowness, bigotry and fanaticism.

1 Selected Essays, 400.
2 Ibid., 401.
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IV. It is not the business of humanism to refute anything. Its business is
to persuade according to the unformulable
axioms of cultnre and good sense. It does
not, for instance, overthrow the arguments
of fallacies like Behaviourism: it operates
by taste, by sensibility trained by culture.
It is critical rather than construct! ve.
It is necessary for the criticism of soci&l
~ life and social theories, political
life and political theories.
Without humanism we could not cope
with Mr. Shaw, Mr. Wells, Earl Russell,
Mr. Menoken, Mr. Sandburg, M. Claudel,
Herr Ludwig, Mrs. MacPherson, or the governments of America and Europe.

v. Humanism can have no positive theories about philosmphy or theology; all it
can ask, in the most tolerant spirit, is:
Is this particular philosophy or religion
civilized or is it not?
VI. There is a type of person whom
we call the Humanist, for whom humanism
is enough. This type is valuable.
VII.
itself, in
not set up
philosophy

Humanism is valuable (a) by
the "pure humanist," who will
humanism as a substitute for
and religion, and (b) as a
me~iating and corrective ingredient in a
positive civilization founded on definite belief.
VIII. Humanism, finally, is valid
for a very small minority of individuals.
But it is culture, not any subscription
to a comr.on programme or platform, which
binds these individuals together. Such
an "intellectual aristocracy" has not the
economic bonds which Q~ite the individuals
of an "aristocracy of birth."3

3

Ibid., 400f.
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From a study of this list two things are at once apparent: in the mind of Eliot the genus of humanism is general
culture.

Secondly, to continue the attempt to give a strictly

philosophicHl definition, the specific difference of humanism
is found in its function.
Culture has a high place in Eliot's scale of values-perhaps too high a place.

"Culture," he says in one instance,

"is not enough, even though nothing is enough without culture."4
Of the

n~ ture

of culture, however, Eliot nowhere commits himself

to a clear statement.

Most of his remarks on culture occur in

his essay "Arnold and Pater,"5 in which he is chiefly concerned
with showing that Arnold, and Pater after him, had confused and
exaggerated notions of culture, making of it a substitute for
religion.

This po:nt, ana for that matter the whole essay,

is strongly reminiscent of Eliot's censures of the New Humanism
of Babbitt and F'oerster.

Indeed, be states it as his opinion

that Arnold and his culture-cult is a~orerunner of what is now
called (New] Humanism. "6
Although cu.lture is something ''specifically religious"
as he tells us in another place,?

4
5
6

7

it is not to attempt to

Ibid., 399.
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supersede relig:lon.
conduct and

t~ste, "8

It is the property of an "elite of thought,
who ''recognize the public and private re-

sponsibility of patronage of the best that is made and
written."9
While "national" culture is something at Which "you
c:nnot ••• aim di.rectly,"l0 in the individual it should be the pre»
duct of an education expressly directed towards it as a goal.ll
In commenting on a remark of Foerster which he quotes, he specifies somewhat the educational program that will produce culture
in the individual, and in so doing he sheds light on his own
idea of it.
"Greek scu~pture ••• , Homer, Sophocles,
Plato, A~istotle, Virgil, Horace, Jesus,
Paul, Augustine, Francis of A~sisi, Buddha, Confucius, Shakespeare, Milton, and
Goethe" ••• : for culture these are the sorts
of authority to which we may properly
look .••• This is the best possible background.l2
From his fl.onte~t it is obvious that Foerster in compiling
the list which Eliot quotes looked upon Jesus and Paul as merely
human philosophers whose teachings were to be accepted only
insofar as they were ~pproved by man's reason, and not on any

8
9

Ibid., 77.

:rora.,

40.

10 -niTd., 39.
11 Ibii:r., 77.
12 seiected Essays, 398 f.
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divine authority.

For his purpose Eliot accepts the list

and approves it as a list of teachers of culture, though from
what he says elsewhere it is clear that he does not join Foerster in his unbelief.
In Eliot's mind, t.herefore, culture is a sort of
mental wealth amassed through culling for oneself the finest
in the experiences available to man.

It is the wealth that is

acquired through wide and thorough acquaintance with the good,
the true, and the beautiful, as they are minifested in the lives
and teachings of great and wise men, and in art and nature.
It is real wealth, however, only if stamped with the discipline
of religion and philosophy.

A man po,ssessed of culture is able,

thanks to long and intimate association with what is genuinely
fine, to recognize in any surroundL,gs what is truly ::1oble and
in harmony with the best in human nature.

He knows truth,

goodness, and beauty well enough to recognize them upon sight.
Moreover, he is impelled to choose what is true, good, and
beautiful, thanks to that s·1me intimate association with it, for
that association has taught him the surpassing value of what
is fine and noble.
To stun up briefly: In Eliot's mind culture is an attitude of mind, conditioned by philosophy and religion, which
enables man to recognize and impels him to choose, whatever is
good, true, and beautiful.

r
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Thus far Eliot on culture.

There remains the further

question of Eliot's views on the relation of

c~lture

to human-

ism, but of that we shall speak after we have completed our formulation of the definition of humanism as understood by Eliot.
The discussion of that further problem will shed additional
light on Eliot's notion of culture in itself.

r-~----------------------------------~

CHAPTER IV
THE SPECIFIC DIFFERENCE OF HUMANISM :
ITS FTJN'C'l'I ON
We have seen that the generic note of humanism in the
mind of Eliot is culture.

Now we

r~ome

to an investigation of

its specific difference, its function.
The function of humanism we may look at under four
aspects: first, the

function itself; secondly, the object upon

which humanism functions; thirdly, the manner in which it functions; and finally, the reason for which it functions.
speaks more of less explicitly of each of

the~e

Eliot

four aspects

at least briefly.
The function of humanism as Eliot u1derstands 1 t is
cr·iticism.

It is to "wersuade according to the un..f'ormulable

axioms of culture and good sense....
constructive."l

It is c ri tical rather than

"It is essentially critical •..• n2

Although

humanism is not to stump for any particular body of philosophic
or religious dogma, it is clear that its criticism is intended
to lead to an acceptance of the cultured and sensible opposite
of what has been rejected under fire of its criticism and per-

l
2

Selected Essays, 400.

Ibid. , 38b.
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suasion.

In this sense, at least, the

constructive.

c~iticism

is positive and

A humanism purely destructive in tis criticism

would be a false humanism.

"If you find examples of humanism

which are anti-religious •.• , then such human:lsm is purely destructive [and false} , for it has never found anything to replace what it destroyea.n3
The object upon which humanism fm1ctions--that which
it criticizes--is really civilized life in its multiple manifestations.

Humenism

i~ecessary for the criticism of social
life and social theories, political life
and poli tica.l theories.... It cv.n ask ••• :
Is this psrticular philosophy or religion
civilized or is it not ••• ·? Humanism is
valuable as a mediating and corrective
ingredient in a pos:tt:i.ve civilization
founued on definite belief.4

Again, "philosophy ••• science •.• and religion depend upon humanism to preserve their

~anity."5

Social and political life and theory, science, philosophy, and religion--all come under the tolerant scrutiny of
humanism to be criticized.

The whole life of man is the object

of the functioning of humanism.

3
4
5

Ibid., 387.
Ibid., 400.
Humanism and America, 110.
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The manner in which humanism functions is described
by Eliot in the intr:tguing phrase already quoted: "according
to the unformulable axioms of culture and good sense."6

Again,

"it operates by taste, by sensibility trained by culture."7
Furthermore, its criticizing must be done "in the most tolerant
spirit."8
What Eliot is

d~iving

at here is made more

cle~r

if

one keeps in mind other points in his list of the functions of
humanism.

In that li.st he says:
Humanism ••• is concerned less with
"reason" than with common sense. When
it proceeds to exact definitions it becomes something other than itself ••••
It is not the business of humanism
to refute anything •••• It does not,
for instance, overthrow the arguments
of fallacies like Behaviourism ••.. 9
In other woEds, humanism does not demand of its op-

ponent a definition of terms and syllogistic proof of the position held.

It does not explain the "state of the question,"

or rtistinguish or deny majors and minors.

That whole type of

argument, the fruit of "reason," is outside the scope of humanism.

6
7
8

9

It is in this sense that "humanism ••• is not concerned

Selected Essays, 400.
Loc. cit.
LoC:" C'I't:"
Loc.

en:--
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with philosophical foundations •••• nlO

Rather humanism simply

holds up for comparison with its opponent the axioms of culture
and common sense--unformulable axioms, it is true, but infallible because they are grounded in human nature itself.

Thus

Behaviourism would be discredited in the eyes of the humanist
not because of any specifically philosophical inconsistencies it
contains, rut simply because i.t is, on the .face of it, strictly
non-sensical.

It is true that humanism pBesupposes philosophi-

cal training, and religious and scientific and literary training too; for without the emotional and intellectual discipline
given by these studies, as Eliot says, "humanism tends to shrink
into an atrophied caricature of itself."ll
spe~ifically

But when he acts

as a humanist, a man does not rely upon the specif-

ic facts taught him by these studies inariticizing the phase of
life or thought at hand.

Rather he makes his criticism in the

light of the total educational r_.esidue which these studies,
together with the whole of his life-experience as a member of
the human race, have built into him.
This is an important point, because here we see the
difference between the mere scholar and the humanist, between
the student who bristles with facts and the really educated man
b.as assimilated his factual knowledge and made it a part

10
11

Loc. cit.
HUminrsm-and America, 111.
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of a genuine personal culture, who has been formed as well
as informed.

It is here that we seenthe specifically human-

istic value of literary and classical education, which puts the
student into contact with the great minds of ages past, and permits him to widen his experience by enabling him to live vicariously the lives of which he reads in fiction and biography.
It is here also

t~at

we see why, as Eliot insists throughout

his works, culture and not mere information should be the end
result of true education; and why genuine culture is never really completely finished until the human experience of the individual is ended with death; and why, therefore, genuine educatioh is a matter of a lifetime, a sentence whose period is
the tombstone.
It is quite possible that a non-humanist scholar could
dispatch a philosophical error with much greater speed and technical eclat than a humanist.

The former in that case would

have specific facts at hand which would give the lie to error
by means of irrefragable syllogistic proof.

The humanist, rely-

ing on those axioms of culture and good sense, would also dispatch the error to his own satisfaction, but without the resounding clatter of specific philosophic knowledge.
to deprecate specific knowledge.

This is not

Such knowledge is necessary as

~liot insists, but it is not enough. Everyone is familiar with
those unhappily talented people who at the drop of a hat spew
lforth an impressive array of facts upon any given sub,ject and who
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thereby efficiently clJse further discussion of that subject
by r·endering it apparently superfluous, but who do it with an
angularity and awkwardness pi tifu.l to behold.

Such persons,

much as they may possess in the line of factual knowledge, lack
the humanistic attitude, lack culture.

Their

knowle~ge

is

like a newly cast bronze statue freshly set in a garden--glittering, compelling attention, yet offensive because not yet
assimilated and blended into its surroundings.

Only after the

wind and the sun and the rain have clothed it in verdigris, and
the plants at its base have grown and clung about it to make it
truly a part of the garden, only then will the statue be completely a thing of beauty.

In like manner, unless factual know-

ledge is assimilated and made a part of the whole humanistic
mind--and in its a ssim:l.lati on much of that factual knowledge will
lose its "formulability"--it will never be completely an asset
to its possessor.
An interesting parallel sug::;ests itxelf here that may
be of use in clearing up further the aotion of "unformulable"
axioms of culture.

In every industry, in every field of profes-

sional endeavor, experts are governed in many of thetr actions
and judgments by "unformulable axioms."

For instance, the

pilot of a river steamboat who eases his unwieldy craft into the
dock without so much as scratching its finish is one of these.
How does he know just when to signal for the shutting off of
power?

Wind and water conditions may vary at every approach to
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the dock, yet every time the pilot docks his boat with the same
perfection of result.

Obviously, he can do this only because

he has had long experience at his post.

He is "cultured" in

the handling of steamboats, and his signals to the boiler-room
are given in accordance with the unformulable axioms that experi
ence has taught him.

He could ntJt explai.n why it is at this

moment rather than at the next that the signal is given.
just the "rigr.tt moment"; that i a all.

It is

His ateamboa t "culture"

tells him so.
In much the same manner the humanist is guided by
such instincts or unformulable axioms.

His long experience

with beauty tells him, for example, that this picture is, and
that that

pictur~

is not, on object of genuine

be~uty.

Perhaps

he could not defend his decision against a 11 arguers; yet he
would remain convinced because he knows that those unformulable
axioms which have unconsciously guided him in hts judgment are
infallible.

He could not explain just why he thinks the one

painting beautiful and the other not beautiful.

His culture

tells him so, but it tells him in wordless language.
To conclude our discussion of the third aspect of the
function of hQmanism, the manner of its functioning, we may say
now with somewhat fuller understanding that hu0anism criticizes
civilized life in a cultural manner, or according to the unformulable axioms of culture.

The axioms will be provided out

of the philosophical, religious, and broadly literary fund of

r
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knowledge and experience that is culture.
The fourth aspect of the function of humnnism is the
function considered in its proper result or end.

In the list

of functions already quoted Eliot notes that "humani.sm makes
for breadth, tolerance, equilibrium and sunity.
against fanaticism."l2

It operates

Elsewhere he says: "Humanism should

strive to ••• reconcile all the parts unto a whole. »13

Again:

"Humanism can only be quite actual in the full realization and
balance of the disciplined emotional and intellectual life of
man."l4
At this juncture we can see clearly.the continuity of
Eliot's humanism with what has always been recognized as classical humanism.

"Breadth, tolerance, e~uilibrium and sanity"

were the ideals towards which Greek and Roman humanism strove,
and towards which the Renaissance humanists also looked.

The

fanaticism against which Eliot's humanism works is the "too
much"aga1n~t which Pindar directed his famous

"r'1dev ~r•v''.l5

Eliot's ide81 is much like the aurea mediocritas which Horace

12

13
14
15

Selected Essais, 400.
Humanlsm and.merica, 111.
Loc. c i t . Fragm~216. Attributed by Aristotle to Chilo: Rhetoric
l389b4.
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advocated.l6

For fanaticism after all is merely a lack of

proper proportion--too much of a good thing.
Fanaticism understood in this sense is a part of the
heritage of or:t.ginal sin.

It is possible only beca,Jse of the

disorder' among the faculties of man which resulted from the
fall.

Eliot recognizes this.

He l:tas no doubts wither on the

one hand as to the imperfection of man in his present.state,
or on the other as to the possibility of improving him.

He

speaks of the doctrine of original sin as a "very real and tremendous thing.nl7

He excoriates the modern New Humanists for

whom, because of their "refusal to believe any longer in the
radical imperfection of either man or nature ••• , the problem
of evil disappeat?s, the conception of sin disappears.nl8
The function of humanism,

the~

is not something

rendered superfluous by any supposed perfection of man.
manlsm can always find reason for functioning.

Hu-

Furthermore,

lt can function with the hope of accomplishing with a reasonable measure of success what it sets out to do.

Man, strictly

speaking, is not perfectible, nor capable of infinite improvement.

16
17
18

"There is an absolute to which Man can never attain,"

Carmina, Lib. 2, N. 10, 1. 5.
After Strange Gods, 62.
Selected Essays, 401. Eliot is quoting with approval from
T. E. Hulme.
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even though he can "apprehend perfection.nl9

He can improve

himself 11 develop his faculties harmoniously and wj.thout a fanatical over-emphasis on any one of them.
in which humat;1ism operates.

Here is the field

This is the object of its function-

ing: to help man to develop himself in an ord:erly, harmonious,
well-proport:i.oned manner.
But fanaticism is not the exclusive bugbear of the/
individual.

Fanaticism of a larger sort occurs as an ailment

of all the various branches of society or of society as a whole.
And here too humanism has i.ts work of persuas:ton and criticism
to do.

A civilization "founded on definite belief" :ts in acute

danger of becoming fanatical and narrow-minded in its attachment to that belief.

For such a civilization "humanism is

valuable ••• as a mediating and corrective ingredient. tt20
Religion, Eliot believes, is of its very nature
prone to fanaticism and is in need of the critical s..,ervices of
humanism.

Eliot has much tosay on this matter.

Because of its

importance and because of the length at which it must be treated, the question of the inter-relation of humanism and religion
has been relegated to a separate later chapter.
Philosophy and science too are in need of the medi-

19
2o

Loc. cit.

rm.-;-:ruo.

54

ating and cor1•ecti ve influence of humanism if they are to avoid
falling into an unharmonious or fanatical development.
Humanism can offer neither the intellectual discipline of philosophy or
of science (two differen~ disciplines)
• • • • On the other hand, these other activities depend upon humanism to preserve
their sanity •.•. Without it, science can
be merely a process of technical research,
bursting out from time to time, and especially in our time, into the sentimental monstrosities like the Life Force, or Professor Whitehead's God.21
Humanism must also reconcile men of different or
apparently different and confl:tcting interests and persuade
'

them to abandon the fanatical quality of the interests which
produces conflict.
It is the spirit of humanism which has
operated to reconcile the mystic and the
e~Hrltes!tastitc in one church....
It is the
humanist who could poi::1t out to the theologian the absurdities of his repudiation,
acceptance, or exploitation of "science,"
and to the scientist the absurdities of
his repudiation, acceptance, or exploitation of rel:igion.22
Early in the discussion of Eliot's humanism it was
pointed out tha t the genus of humanism was general culture;
its specific difference its function.

21
22

Humanism and America, 110 f.

Ibid., 11r.-

General culture has
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been discussed, and the function of humanism has been explained
under four heads.

With that the attempt to f ormula.te the posi-

tive definition of humanism as it is understood in the writings
ofT. S. Eliot is complete.

In summary Eliot's definition of

humanism may be stated as follows:
Humanism is general culture functioning

~

critic

of civilized life in all its aspeot!L tolerantly judgins it

!n

the light of cultural axioms,

the abandonment of
the individual.

~

~ fa~~icism,

striving to bring about

whether in societl

~

in

r

Cl-.:1\.PTIR V

A NEGATIVE DEFINITION OF HU:MANISI(;
TFE EXTEN'l' OF HT.:r.tANISM;

HUMANISH AND CULTURE.

Since Eliot's treatment of humanism is so largely
negative, it will be appropriate and

~-:c lpful

te a fuller under-

standing of our topic to give the texts ln which he tells what,
in his mind, humanism is not.
First of all, Eliot insists again and aglin that hu'1Wnism is not a state of :mind or a body of dogrra thqt can
stand by itself.
ture.

This would belie its essentially critical na-

nTo exist at all, it is dependent on some other attitude,

for it is e ssentiRlly critical. •.• 11 1
Again, Eliot insists with constant reiteration that
as a result of :lts dependent na.ture, humanism cannot be set
up aR a religion or a philosophy in :tts own right.
of humanism, though necessary, is secondary.
humanism itself into a'-religi on. tt2

"The function

You cannot make

"The humanistic point of

v:lew is auxiliiary tt:--and dependent upon the religious point

1

Selected Essays, 385.

2

Ibid.. , 400.
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of view. 11 3 ":ilumanismis valuable.~.by itself, in the 'pure
r.umanist

1

'I.Vho will not set up humanism as n substitute for

philosophy and religion....

The function of humani am is not

to provide dogmas or philosophical theories....

Humanism can

have nc positive theories about philosophy or theolo&Y•"4
Finally, it "is not the business of humanism torefute anything ••••

It does not, for instance, overthrow the

arguments of fallacies like Behaviourism ••• ; 11
"exact definitions."5

·

it does not

It persuades, not by syllogistic argu-

ing, but s:tmply by inducing the realization that that of which
it disapproves is not in harmony with that which is best in and
best f

O!'

..,o.n.
T!IE EXTEN'J.l OF HUMANISM

Strange though it may seem, Eliot prescribes a very
limited extent to humanism: " ••• l.:.u.m.anism is, I think, merely
the state of mind of a few persons in a
tLnes."6

fe~

places at a few

Again, "humanism is valid •.• for a very small minor-

ity of individuals. "'7

Snch a r..,e strict ion of the extent of

huma:::1.ism is Sllrprising in the light of other things that Eliot
has had to say.

3

Ibid., 381.

5
6
7

Loc. cit.
'I13i"Q. -;-3"85 .
'T15I"Q., 401

4 m., 4oo.

As has been shown, he considers it necessary
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if religion, philosophy, science, and political and social life
are not to become fanatical and lose their sanity.

If only

few people are humanj_ sts, it would seem that most people must
be fanatics in Eliot's opinion.
The solution to this problem lies in the fact that
in the places in which he restricts humanism so strikingly
Eliot is speaking of "pure" humanism only, and not of "less
pure" types which would be more widespread.

He himself uses

this terminology in one of the very contexts in which he limits humanism's extent so sever ely.

A cormnentator on Eli. ot 's

work says of the point in question:
••• There are many different grades •••
of humanism. Suppose we let M represent
the common or barnyard variety •••• Grade
M•.• humanism is flat common eense ••.•
Remembering all that we owe to good human
common sense, we must declare that there
is certainly such a thing as a humanistic
habit: it is the state of mind of many
persons in many places at many times.
When Eliot declares that "there is
no humanistic habit: humanism is, I think,
merely the state of mind of a few persons
in a few places at a few times"--he is
thinking of grade A humanism, or let's
say, grades A, B, and c.8
If this interpretation of Eliot's mind is correct, his judg-

8

G. R. Elliott, nT. s. Eliot and Irving Babbitt," The American
Review, VII, 445 f, (September, 1936).
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ment on the extent of humanism is much less severe than it
seems to be at first sight.

"Pure" humanism, in that case,

would be the property of a small number; "less pure" humanism
the habit of many minds.
THE RELATIONSHIP OF HUMANISM AND CUL'l'URE

The precise nature of the relationship of humanism
and culture in the mlnd of T. S. Eliot is not at first easy to
see.

The difficulty arises out of the fact that the relation-

ship is such an intimate one that at first it is difficult to
distinguish the two.

However, if the definitions of the two

phenomena are placed side by s:tde, the difference becomes easily
apparent.
It has been concluded th:::,t culture as understood by
Eliot is an attitude of mind, conditioned by philosophy and
religion, which enables man to recognize and impels him to
choose, whatever is good, true, and beautiful.9

Humanism,

on the other hand, is general culture funct:i. oning as critic of
civilized life in all its aspects, tolerantly judging it in
the light of cultural axioms, and striving to bring about the
abandonment of all fanaticism, wheilher in society or in the
individua1.10

9
10

cr.

It is mt once apparent, then that humanism is,

thesis, 42.
Ibid . , 55 •
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briefly, culture in action.

Culture is the static accumula-

tion of wealth; humanism is that wealth in the act of purchasing some good.

Though there could, conceivaclw, be culture

without humanism, there could never be humanism without culture.

HumaniEm

~

culture, and is related to it therefore as

a specified individual to its genus.
Moreover, the entire activity of humanism depends
upon the existence of culture.

Humanism would depend upon cul-

ture in this way for its activity even in the impossible hypothesis that it could exist without culture, inasmuch as all
of its criticizing is done in the light of those "axioms of
culture" of which we have spoken so often, and which, obviously
would not be available were there no culture in existence to
beget and produce them.

When humanism comes upon a false phil-

osophic system, or an erroneous judgment in ethics, or a painting or a statue that violates the canons of art, it looks to
the fund of training and experie_nce that is cult1.1re.
it finds the tastes and sensitilities

whic~

There

rebel against any

acceptance of these things, each of which is in some way·guilty
oft1fanaticism."

Culture criticizes them--or rather humanism

(which is culture in action} criticizes them--and rejects them,
even though, perhaps, it could not formulate a water-tight defense of the rejection.

Its criticism and rejection is made

in the light of broad experience and intimate association with
truth, goodness, and beauty.

When culture acts in this manner
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and to this end, Eliot calls it humanism.

Humanism is culture

in action, culture exerting a critical influence upon the civilized life around it.

CHAPTER VI
THE RELATIONSHIP OF HUMANI8M AND RELIGION
Eliot speaks more frequently of the mutual relationship of humanism and religion than of any other relationship
that humanism of its nature acquj_res.

In part this is due to

the fact that in Eliot's mind there is grave danger of New
Humanism setting itself up as a religion.

But it is also due

to the fact that of itself this critical relationship is i~
portant.
It is necessary first of all to discover what Eliot
means by religion when he speaks.of it in the contexts presently of interest to us.
to be.

This is not as~asy as perhaps it ought

One would expect Eliot to be more explicit than usual

on so important a topic, and one which engages his attention
so frequently.

As a matter of fact, however, it is here that he

is more disappointing than anywhere else.

Although he is a

~oyal and ardently active member of the Anglican Church--"that
pdd•st of institutions," as he calls itl--he is not consistent
even when speaking specifically of that church.

~ Thoughts after Lambeth, 5.
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Vfuen he speaks of religion in relation to humanism,
however, he certainly does not limit the meaning of the word
''religion" to Anglicanism.

"For us of the western world,"

he says, "religion is Christian! ty; and Christianity implies,
I think, the conception of the church."2
characteristicl)

{That "I think" is

Eliot speaks at some length about the church

which he thinks Christianlty implies, but because of his lack
of theological training and hjs admitted incapacity for prolonged abstruse thought, it is impossible to arrange his ideas
into a self-consistent pattern.
For the purpose of the present chapter it is enough
to know that by the "Christian Church" Eliot means a body
ruled by a hierarchy which speaks with final authority "in matters of dogma, matters of faith and morala,"3

and which ex-

ists for the "glory of God, and the sanctification of souls."4
These latter two works form its essential business.

Glory is

to be rendered to God through the medium of the Church services, and the sanctification of souls is to be effected through
the administration of the sacraments.

"So long as the sacra-

ments are provided for the benefit of men, and the services
for the glory of God, the Church is doi1~ what is ita essential

2
3
4

Selecte1 Essays, 391.
The Idea
a Christian Society, 47.
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business."5
Apparently Eliot does not think of the Church as a
divinely established institution.

He speaks of the Church of

England as not"the creation of a single intelligence,".but
"the composite production of three hundred minds."6

N6 r does

he believe in the guidance of the Church as such by the Holy
Spirit, for he laments that the Bishops of his own church have
almost surrendered "the whole citadel of the Church" in their
statement on birth control.7

More strikingly still, he says

of the Roman Catholic Church--in his mind a branch of his uwn
and the Greek churches of the one, tri-partite Catholic Church-that
it is in danger of splitting up into various local and political factions which
will retain only the name and the observances of Catholicism.8
This is the religion which is in need of the critical services of humanism, because unless the church is cri ticized it will become fanatical.

This is true because "the hier-

archy is liable to corruption, and certai.nly to stupidity" and
because "religious belief when unquestioned and uncrlticized

5
6
7
8

"What Does the Church Stand It'or? 1• The Spectator, CLIII, 560,
(October 19, 1934).
Thoughts After Lambeth, 24.
Ibid., 17.
HUmanism and America, 107.
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is liable to degeneration into superstition."9

Again, "Any

religion, of course, is for ever in danger of petnifaction
into mere ritual and habit, though ritual and habit be eaaential to religion."lO
All of this can be avoided, however, if humanism is
at hand to point out the absurdities into which religion would
otherwise inevitably fall.

Religion, he says, "is only

~enewed

.and refreshed by an awakening of feeling and fresh devotion,
or by the critical reason.
humanist.nll

The latter may be the part of the

Without the crit1.cal services of humanism to save

it from itself, religion plumbs the depths of absurdity.

For

whthout humanism, he says,
religion •.• produces the vulgarities and the
political compromises of Roman Catholicism;
the vulgarities and fanaticism of Tennessee;
it produces Mrs. MacPherson •••• Religion
without humanism produces ••• religious bigotry •••• Religion tends to become either
as entimental tune, or an emotional debauch;
or in theology, a skeleton dence of fleshless dogmas, or in ecclesiasticism, a s_oulless political club.l~
If one grants that there is in the Jhristian church
no divine guidance, it may be that the work that Eliot assigns
to humanism in the perservation of sanity and orthodoxy in re-

9 Ibid., 105.
10 -se!ected Essays, 387.
11 Loc. cit.12 HUmanism and America, 107 ff.
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ligion is not too large.

S~mething

must operate as a safe-

guard of religious truth, and if this is not provided by direct d:i. vine supervision of the Church, then it may well be that
this important role must be assigned to humanism.

Indeed, 1 t

is certain that in his confusion of essence with a cciden'\;
Eliot looks to humanism to do the work which, according to
Roman Catholic doctrine, will be at the last found to be done
by the Holy Spirit Himself or by Christ HiMself dwelling forever within His Church.

There ls no denying that God always

except in the rarest instances directs and intervenes in the
bu.s:ttness of the Church Militant by His operation u'l)on the human
ministers of that Church, and that the humanistic attitude which
His Providence fosters within them is of vital importance in
preserving what He has c0nstituted as the "sanity a.nd orthodoxy"
of the Church.

To admit all this, however, is a far cry from

positing humanism unqualified and unrelated to God's omn:i.potent
directive Providence as the performer of all these essential
offices.

It may be that Eliot understands humanism in the

Church as being the tool which the Holy Spirit uses in guid:ing
the Church, but he gives no inkling of such an opinion in his
writing.

According to Eliot it is humanism that will keep re-

ligion from becoming a"sentimental tune or an emotional debauch."

It is humanism that will keep it from the "wlgarities

and fanatic:tsm of 'J.lennessee."

It is humanism that must come to

the rescue of the Roman Church and save :i.t from splitting up
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into national a_n d political factions.

Surely even according

to the Roman Catholic view there is a place, a necessity, for
human agency in the preservation of the Church in its true
spirit.

But to make the human contribution such a vastly im-

portant one is to a Homan Catholic an error of the gravest
nature.
The disparaging remarks that Eliot makes with regard
to Roman Catholicism are the more surprising in viev> of the
fact that he has a number of ideas that are strongly Roman in
connotation and historical backgroung.

For instance, in the

ideal Christian state he would have a Church that "in matters
of dogma, matters of faith and morals •.• will speak with final
authority ••.• "13

He speaks with favor of persons "of either

sex electing a life of celibacy," and says that Christians
should have "a respect for religious life, for the life of
prayer and contemplation, and for those who attempt to practice
it," for he

n

cannot conceive a Christian society wlthout religi.-

ous orders, even purely contemplative orders, even enclosed
orders."l4
It may be objected. that this whole criticism of Eliot'
ideas on religion and humanism is given from
point--that of the Roman Catholic Church.

13

14

The Idea of a Christian Society, 47.

Ibid-:-;--6'0!.-

~

partisan view-

Such a treatment is
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justified, however, for two reasons.

First, Eliot believes

that the English and the Roman communions are two branches of
the same Church.

Presumably then according to Eliot the two

communions would agree at least as to the concept of the Church
itself.

Secondly, in discussing his ideas from the Roman point

of view the tbesis takes the cue from Eliot himself, for whenever he speaks of Anglicanism or of his own beliefs, he does
so with one eye on the Roman view of what he is saying.
With all of these criticisms in mind it still remains
for us to see mat it is precisely that Eliot bel:leves humanism
must do for religion.

From the general definition of humanism

we know that it will strive tobring about the abandonment of
anytiHng that would lead to f..,anaticism of any sort in religion.
This it will do by criticizing the Churchw.,henever it swerves
from the direct path to its goal.

Since the church exists for

the glory of God and the sanctification of souls, the two terms
of the great Christian relation are God and man.

In general,

therefore, there will be two greo.t possibilities of error: one
will be to make Christianity too highly spiritual as a result
of looking with excessive zeal at the divine term of the relation; the other will be to make it too easy because of an overemphasis upon the frailty of the human term.
fanatical extremes must be avoided.

Both of these

On the one hand Christian-

ity must not be permitted to become that "skeleton dance of
fleshless dogmas" or that "soulless political club" of which he
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speaks.

On the other hand it must not become "a sentimental

tune, or an emotional debauch."

Humanism will have tqmake

Christians realize that their religion is one which "has practicalresults which may be ino-onvenient,"l5 and that it is a religion in which "thought, study, mortification, and sacrifice...•
have an important part to play;"l6

while at the same time this

same humanism guards against too spiritual or too mystical a
regimen.
Humanism is to tfto this of course by means of the unformulable axioms of culture and good sense which it uses as
criteria of judgment.

It is here that we see most clearly the

weakness of Eliot's case.

While humanism would be well able to

deai with the non-essential "vulgarities" of a given church,
it would be completely inadequate in the handling of dogmatic
or moral questions except in extreme cases.

Humanism would be

enough to tell one that what the "Holy Rollers" look upon as
relgion is an emotional debauch.

The humanist's culture and

good sense would make it clear to him that the frenzied antics
of such people are unworthy of so dignified a creature as rational man.

It would make it clear to him that such antics, far

from bringing sanctity and glory to God, might very well lead
to carnal sin.

15
16

But in cases not so extreme as this humanism

Ibid., 93.
ThOUghts after Lambeth, 16.
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would be an insufficient guide, with the insufficiency mounting
as the cases to be handled became more subtle and approached
closer to the truth.

The reason for this is obvious.

The

Christian religion transcends the bounds of mere rationality.
Unlike philosophy, it contains many truths known to man only
because they have been r.,evealed to him by God.

Many of these

truths are in apparent contradiction to human reason at first
glance.
the
mas.

No doubt sheer humanism would look upon the doctrine of

T~inity

as a notable skeleton in the dance of fleshless dog-

Even the teaching of the Roman Catholic Church on contra-

ception seems too bony to Eliot, for he lauds the Bishops of
his own church for their

declar~tion

that liberal exceptions

should be made in forbidding the practice, although he does
not agree with them when they say that the exceptions are to
be decided upon by the individual married couples themselves.l7
It is clear then that Eliot expects too much of mere
humanism when he asks it to criticize the essentials of religion.
It can do good work in criticizing the accidentals, which pertain
to art rather than to religion, but 1 t has wandered far out of
its legitimate field when it begins to judge religious dogma.
Humanism as such has no adequate criteria for judging the truths
of revelation.

17

While the ideal humanist might be able to deal

Cf. Thoughts after Lambeth, 16 ff.
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adequately with the problems of philosophy, he would be at a
loss to solve those of thedlogy.
There 1.s yet another reason for saying that Eliot
errs grievously in calling upon humanism to assay the fundamentals of religion, for in doing so he falls into what philosophers call a vicious circle.

As he nimself says, he ought not

philosophize who does not know the rules of the game of phil·osophy.l8

As has been shown, humanism aecording to Eliot is

culture in action.

Now culture is impossible if one lacks the

discipline of the emo~tions, the need for which is so great
that "the world hardly understands what the word means. ttl9

But

this all i:::'·;portant discipline "is attainable only through dogmatic religion." 2 0
religion will not be

So far all is well.
al~·le

The difficulty is that

to give this discipline of the emo-

tions unless religion is humanistic, for wfuthout humanism it
will be a sentimental tune or an emotional debauch.

Certainly

one learns no emotional discipline through emotional debaucheryJ
Humanism, then, cannot bu what it should be unless it
is religious; religion can.'r'lot be what it shnuld be unless :l.t is
humanistic.

Humanism depends upon religion for essential sup-

port, relgion depends upon humanism for essent:tal support.

18
19

20

Selected Essays, 398.
Humanism and America, 110.
Loc. cit.---
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Were this unfortunate state of affairs realized, both would
collapse at once.
The inevitable conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing discussion is that Eliot seriously mars his humanistic
theory by bringing theology into the field.

Tfvhile he wins ap-

plause and approval for his theory in general, he canot ask
thinking men to follow him here.

He himself is beyond his depth

when he speaits of technical theological matters.

Even so, one

would expect so penetrating a thirurer to see that the unaided
human powers are inadequate for criticizing matters supernatural·
ly revealed.
abilities.

Such matters are entirely beyond tYeir critical
They can only be accepted humbly e.nd worshipfully

from God and believed because of anqunquestioning faith in the
'Nord of Him ·who can neither decei. ve nor be deceived.

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION

It has been concluded th,,t when T.

s.

of humanism in his prose works he means general

Eliot speaks
~~lture

func-

tioning as critic of civilized life in all its aspects, tolerantly judging it in the light of cultural axioms, and striving
to bring about the abandonment of all fanaticism, whether in
so~!ety

or in the individual.
For the most part this definition is a good one.

Eliot is decidedly at one with the age-old tradition of ola.ssical humanism which strove for a full and proportionate development of all the powers in man.

.. ,,
"M'l dEV o<.r"'-v" and "No

fanaticism" are two ways of saying exactly the same thing.
"Sanity, tolerance, equilibrium"
ocritas."

merely re-echoes "aurea medi-

Eliot, always insistent upon the necessity of re-

specting and drawing profit from tradition, has a theory of
humanism that is for the most part satisfying and immeoiately
appealing to a man of common sense.
the ages.

It is illuminated by the strong light of Eliot's

critical mind.

It is expanded and made to apply to society as

well as to the individual.
flaw.

It has in it the wisdom of

But it also contains a serious
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Eliot's theory of humanism errs by allowing to humanism too wide a field of action.

For humanism is simply incapa-

ble of criticizing civilized life in all its aspects.

As has

been demonstrated, humanism is incapable of a tho:vougll-going
criticism of religion.

Great as are its services to man, hu-

manism must admit its own lim:i.tations or it wi 11 bring all of
its own work to naught by leading man to an attitude of affected independence of the Creator t.hat is religious eclecticism.
For supernatural relig:i.on is outside humani:am 1 s sphere of pperation.

Humanism is incapable of sitting in judgment upon what

is of an origin inflnitely higher than human.

And inasmuch as

Eliot does not admit this fact, he is in the anomalous position
of one who sharply criticizes those who make humanism into a
religion (as he says the New Hillnanists do), yet who himself
sets humanism over religion by making it the arbiter of religious doctrine and practice--and the second error is worse
than the first.
One cannot help feeling an almost po1gnant regret
that Eliot should have erred so in applying hwnanism to practical life.

Sincerely religious man that he is, he is not un-

a.ffected by the modern rationalist tendency to make everything
submit to the judgment of human reason before accepting it
whole-heartedly.

One naturally :axpects more than this from so

penetrating a thinker as Eliot.
Nor can one help wondering where Eliot's further
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speculations will lead him.

In many ways Eliot is strikingly

like another Anglican thinker of an earlier age, John Henry
Newman.

There can be no coubt that Newman was the more pro-

found and incisive thinker of the two.

But Eliot's thought may

yet lead him also along the path that Newman trod--past the
bete noire of Catholic "vulgarity," into the dark night of
faith, through the straight way and the narrow gate of humility
and submission, into the everlasting light and peace of God's
truth.

Fiatl

FiatJ
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